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A significant part of the patents held by a firm are not used. We show that, given the 
uncertainty of invention quality at the patent application stage and the sunk cost 
incurred for obtaining and developing a patent, the patent (internal) utilization rate 
declines with the (anticipated) size of complementary assets, licensing opportunity, and 
invention quality uncertainty while it increases with the average quality of an invention. 
We find empirical evidence supportive of these theoretical predictions. Moreover, a 
firm with larger price cost margin does not have a lower rate of patent utilization, which 
does not support the view of preemptive R&D and patenting as a primary explanation of 
unused patents. Finally, a firm with more diversified patent portfolio tends to have more 
patents but its utilization rate tends to be lower, suggesting that such diversification 
facilitates appropriation.   
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1. Introduction 
While a large R&D intensive firm has many patents reaching thousands in number, their 
significant fraction is not used either for production or for licensing. In addition, there 
exist significant variations in the utilization rate across firms and industries. For an 
example, it declines with firm size, and it is very low in drugs and medicine. In 
particular, a large firm uses considerably less of its patents (see Figure 1 in section 3). 
Such variations have obvious and important implications on the measures of R&D 
productivity based on the patent counts. Furthermore, the variation of the utilization rate 
could provide important clues on the effects of a firm’s R&D strategy such as 
preemption and diversification, which would be difficult to be identified based only on 
the information on the number of patents acquired. Despite of the importance of the 
issue, its theoretical and empirical studies are scarce. 
Existing literature suggests the following two causes of unused patents. First, a 
patent has an option value, even if currently unused (see Pakes (1986)). As long as this 
option value exceeds the cost of the patent renewal, a patent is maintained, even if it is 
not in use. This view suggests that a firm which faces greater uncertainty in the values 
of a patent has more unused patents
1, but it cannot explain the negative relationship 
between firm size and patent utilization rate. Second, a firm may choose not to use a 
patent but still wants to keep it, in order to make it more difficult for a competitor to 
invent-around its core technology in use. This view, however, does not immediately 
explain why a large firm has proportionately more of such patents. Such tendency may 
appear if a firm with market power engages in preemptive R&D and patenting so as to 
deter the entry of a competitor (see Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Newbery (1987)). 
However, there is a question how pervasive such preemptive R&D is, since successful  3
preemption requires that inventing-around is difficult and that the incumbent has the 
first mover advantage in R&D. 
We would like to add the following explanation, which is driven by the 
uncertainty over the quality of an invention which exists at the patent application stage 
but is resolved by its commercialization stage, and the sunk cost incurred for obtaining 
and developing a patent. The sources of such uncertainty include the availability of 
complementary or substitute technologies and the regulatory uncertainty. We show that, 
given such uncertainty, a firm with more complementary assets has more unused 
patents
2, since such firm gains more from implementing a patented invention so that it 
has a higher propensity to apply for a patent. As formally shown in the analytical 
section, such behavior tends to cause a lower rate of utilizing patents, since such firm 
seeks a patent for a relatively low quality invention. The effect would be similar to that 
of a lower standard of patentability or a lower cost of patenting for such firm. This view 
would help explain why a large firm tends to have lower rate of patent utilization.   
As for empirical literature, there was only one large-scale published survey on 
the utilization of patents until recently, to the best of our knowledge
3. This survey was 
done in 1957 with respect to the US patents. The sample covered randomly 2% of the 
patents issued in three years
4. According to the survey results, the percentage of use 
either currently or in the past was over 55% for all patents. It was higher for small 
companies and more than 71%. Patent utilization is closely related to patent renewal, 
since the fact that a patent is not renewed within a relatively short period is likely to 
indicate that it has not been used. According to Schankerman and Pakes (1986), only 
about half of all patents in European countries is renewed within ten years. In addition, 
it is also found that the fraction of non-renewed patent is larger in France and U.K. than  4
in Germany, in which the renewal cost is the most expensive and the patentability 
standard seems to be the highest. These studies, however, have not analyzed how the 
patent utilization rate depends on the firm-level determinants, such as the 
appropriability advantage of a firm. 
Based on the newly available extensive firm-level database on the use of the 
patents by the Japanese firms, we attempt to assess how the firm level characteristics, 
with a particular focus on the appropriability advantage, uncertainty, and invention 
quality, can account for the pattern of patent acquisition and utilization across Japanese 
firms. We use the extensive survey data (the Survey of Intellectual Property-Related 
Activities; hereafter, the SIPRA data) of the Japanese firms prepared by the Japan Patent 
Office (JPO), matched with the corporate and the other information of the firms listed 
on the Japanese stock exchanges. Although the SIPRA is not a compulsory survey, a 
significant proportion of the Japanese firms responded to it. Thus, we have a pretty 
comprehensive data on the major Japanese corporations
5. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 represents a 
theoretical framework and the main hypotheses we test. In section 3, we discuss the data 
set and summarize basic facts about patent utilization by Japanese firms. Section 4 
presents an estimation framework as well as the construction of variables in our 
estimation. In section 5, we provide the results of estimation, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
We consider the following simple model to explain the unused patents, which take into 
accounts the difference between the ex ante (expected) value of an invention in the 
patent application stage (or the stage of requesting a patent examination) and its ex post  5
value at the commercialization stage, as well as the sunk cost such as patent 
examination fee and the cost of developing the patented invention to be incurred 
between the two stages. We adopt the framework of two-stage (application stage and 
commercialization stage) analysis. We assume that the cost of maintaining a patent in 
the second stage is zero, so that once a patent is granted in the first stage it is maintained 
in the second stage even if it is not used. We assume that the patent application by a 
firm (or its request for patent examination) always results in the patent grant for 
simplicity. We denote the value of an invention at the commercialization stage by  v 
and its expected value at the patent application stage by app v . We denote the number of 
inventions a firm produces by inv, the number of its granted patents by pat, and its R&D 
investment by rd. Larger expenditure of R&D of a firm increases the number of its 
inventions but may reduce the mean quality of inventions (qm) due to a diminishing 
return.  
We consider the patent acquisition and use decision of a firm with respect to an 
exogenous single invention, which has only a marginal effect on the profit of a firm, 
based on the following model. Initially we assume that a firm uses its invention only 
internally. The firm gains the following maximized profit π out of the production and 
sales of quantity s for the constant marginal cost of mc and price p.  
s mc p ) ( − = π                                    ( 1 ) ,  
We assume that the willingness to pay of the consumers toward the product of a firm 
increases with the technological quality  φ   of the product produced by the firm, only if 
such improvement is protected by a patent
6. Given the profit maximizing choice of p (or 
s), the marginal increase of the willingness to pay of the consumers enhances the profit 
of the firm by    6
s p ) / ( / φ φ π ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂                                  ( 2 ) ,  
due to the envelope theorem. If an invention improves the product quality by  φ d , 
patenting such invention has the following (expected) value: 
sQ d p s v = ∂ ∂ = φ φ) / (                             ( 3 )  
Here  φ φ d p Q ) / ( ∂ ∂ =  gives the quality of a patented invention in terms of economic 
value, which represents the expected increase of the willingness to pay of the marginal 
consumer for the product of a firm, due to the patented invention
7. We can consider s to 
indicate the size of the complementary assets, for which a firm can apply the invention 
within a firm. This is because a firm has the production and marketing capacity which 
supports the sales of quantity s. Thus, the (marginal) value of a patented invention 
depends positively on its quality (Q) as well as on the size of its complementary assets 
(s). A firm with a larger size of complementary assets can gain more from the invention 
of the same quality, since it can apply the technology more widely.   
In the following analysis, we take the size of the complementary assets as a 
deterministic parameter and focus on the uncertainty of the invention quality for the 
ease of exposition
8. We assume that the quality of an invention consists of the following 
two random components: 
ε + = q Q  
Here q is invention quality as recognized by the firm at the patent application stage and 
it  is a random variable, reflecting the uncertainty in invention process. ε  is the 
remaining quality uncertainty resolved only through further development of an 
invention after the patent application. The sources of the uncertainty in term of ε  
include the extent by which complementary or substitute technologies are available.  ε   7
has a zero mean for any q since it is an expectation error. We further assume that they 
are independent.   
Given these assumptions, the value of the patented invention at the 
commercialization stage is given by the following specification.   
) ( ε + = q s v                ( 4 )  
A firm seeks a patent examination if the expected value of patenting the invention 
exceeds its patenting and development cost k, which will become sunk in the second 
stage of commercializing a patent, knowing the level of q
9. Given that we use a 
two-stage model, such condition is given by   
k sq q q s E vapp > = + = ) | ) ( ( ε                         
Thus, the non-conditional probability that an invention is patented (that is, patenting 
propensity) is given by the following: 
Patenting propensity= dq q q f s k q q
thr q m thre ) ; ( ) / Pr( ∫
∞
= = >          ( 5 )  
Where f(q; qm) is the probability distribution of q and qm is the mean of the distribution. 
This relationship implies that a firm with the capability of generating high quality 
invention (large qm) or a firm with larger complementary assets (small qthre) has a higher 
patenting propensity. In particular, a firm with larger complementary assets applies for 
more patents for a given statistical distribution of invention quality. Since the number of 
inventions increases with the R&D investment rd, if we denote the mean of the 
distribution of the invention quality by m q , we have the following patenting equation: 
 ) , , / ( rd q k s f pat m =                              ( 6 . 1 ) ,  
 0 ) / ( / > ∂ ∂ k s f ,0 / > ∂ ∂ m q f , and  0 / > ∂ ∂ rd f          ( 6 . 2 ) .    8
A firm uses the granted patent only if the value at the stage of 
commercialization is positive, ignoring the sunk investment in patent application and in 
its development (k ). Thus, the probability that a firm uses the granted patent is given by 
the following conditional probability: 
Probability of use= ) / | Pr( ) | 0 ) ( Pr( s k q q k v q s app > − > = > > + ε ε   
                = ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
−
thre thre q m m q dq q q f dq q q f q g ) ; ( / ) ; ( ) (  (7) 
where g(*) is the cumulative probability function for  ε , which is independent of q by 
assumption. This probability increases with s k qthre / = , since, when  thre q  is large, a 
patent is applied only for a high quality invention which is more likely to be used even 
if a negative shock in terms of ε  occurs. Thus, a firm with larger complementary 
assets has a lower conditional probability of using a granted patent. The conditional 
probability of patent use decreases with the size of uncertainty (the variance of ε  
when the distribution can be approximated by normal distribution), since lower quality 
patent can be unused while higher quality patent is always used. It also increases with 
the mean of the invention distribution qm for a given distribution of q, since an ex ante 
high quality invention is likely to remain as a high quality invention ex post. Thus, we 
have the following three testable propositions. 
 
Proposition 1 (Complementary assets and the sunk cost of patenting and 
developing an invention) 
A larger (anticipated) size of complementary assets increases the patenting propensity 
of a firm and reduces the rate of utilizing the granted patents, when quality uncertainty 
of an invention and the sunk cost for obtaining and developing a patent is important.  9
Larger sunk cost reduces the patenting propensity and increases the utilization rate of 
the granted patents.   
(See the appendix for a formal proof) 
 
Proposition 2 (Quality of invention) 
A firm with high quality portfolio of inventions (high q m) has both a high patenting 
propensity and a high rate of utilizing the granted patents. 
(See the appendix for a formal proof) 
 
Proposition 3 (Uncertainty in the development stage)   
A firm which faces higher uncertainty in developing the patented technology for 
commercial use has a lower rate of utilization.   
(See the appendix for a formal proof) 
 
Let us extend the model to cover the case where a firm has licensing 
opportunities. A firm may unilaterally license its patented technology to the other firms 
or may use it as a bargaining chip in cross-license to reduce the payment for accessing 
the technology of the other firms. The value of such external use of a patented invention 
depends on the size of the complementary assets of the other firms (
* s ) which 
potentially use the invention. Considering a license to a non-competing firm, we have   
) ( ) (
* * * ε ε + + + = q s a q s v                          ( 8 )  
where 
* a  indicates the proportion of the value which the licensor can appropriate and 
* ε  represents uncertainty which exists on the part of a licensee. A firm applies for a  1 0
patent examination if the expected value of the patented invention exceeds the patenting 
and development cost (k): 
k q s a s vapp > + = ) (
* *  or  ) /(
* *s a s k q + >         ( 9 )  
This equation shows that a firm which can license its patented technology has higher 
incentive to patent its invention. A firm, however, uses the granted patent internally 
only if the value at the stage of commercialization is positive, so that the probability that 
a firm internally uses the granted patent is given by   
)) /( | Pr( ) | 0 ) )( Pr((
* * * * s a s k q q k v q s a s app + > − > = > > + + ε ε     ( 1 0 )  
This probability decrease with 
* s . In summary, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4 (Effect of licensing possibility) 
A firm which can license its technology has a higher propensity to patent its invention 
and a lower rate of internally utilizing the granted patents.   
 
The last potential cause of unused patents which we discuss is the strategic 
motivation to acquire the patent only for preventing a competitor from using that 
invention to produce a product substitute to its own product. A firm with such an 
invention would keep its patent even if it is not used internally. Such invention may 
become especially important if a firm has a significant market power, since such firm 
may engage in preemptive R&D and patenting while keeping the granted patents 
unused due to its concern over the cannibalization of the profit of existing products (see 
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Newbery (1987)).     
Proposition 5 (Effect of preemptive R&D and patenting)    1 1
A firm with stronger market power would have a lower rate of utilizing the granted 
patents, if it successfully pursues the strategy of preemptive R&D and patenting.   
3. Data 
The dataset we use is based on the first and the second surveys by the Japan Patent 
Office on the intellectual property-related activities of Japanese firms. It covers 81 % of 
the R&D expenditures by Japanese firms and 62% of the patent applications in Japan 
(see Table A1-1and A1-2 in the Appendix).We use the following firm level information 
on the acquisitions and use of patents in this section: the number of patent stocks owned 
by firms and the number of patents used internally
10. The utilization rate of patents is 
given by their ratio.   
As is shown in Figure 1, the internal utilization rate of granted patents declines 
monotonically with firm size for both domestic and foreign patents. A firm with 
employment size between 20 and 299 uses internally more than 70% of its domestic 
patents and more than 80% of its foreign patents. On the other hand a firm with 
employment size being equal to 3,000 or more uses only 39% of its domestic patents 
and 42% of the foreign patents. The negative correlation between firm size and patent 
utilization is consistent with Proposition 1. In addition, the utilization rate of the patents 
is higher for foreign patents than for domestic patents for all class of firm sizes. Higher 
utilization rate of foreign patents is also consistent with Proposition 1 for the following 
two reasons. A firm tends to have more complementary assets in the domestic market 
than abroad, and the patenting expense is considerably larger for a foreign patent than 
for a domestic patent due to the translation fees.   
(Figure 1)  1 2
Figure 2 shows that these patterns hold in most industrial sectors. A large firm 
has a lower patent utilization rate than a small and medium size firm, except for 
ceramics industry. In addition, the domestic utilization rate is higher than the foreign 
utilization rate in most sectors (exceptions are petroleum and coal products, electricity 
& gas and the other utilities, food, and drugs and medicines). The patent utilization rate 
of pharmaceutical industry is one of the lowest in both domestic and foreign patents, 
which could be explained by Proposition 3. A firm in the pharmaceutical industry needs 
a long time from invention to commercialization and there exist significant uncertainty 
between the two stages which has to be resolved, including the regulatory approval 
(thus, the variance of ε is large). 
(Figure 2) 
Figure 3 shows the patent utilization rates, according to different average 
length of time which elapsed between applications and grants. A firm which spends 
longer time until a patent grant tends to have a lower rate of exploiting the patents. A 
firm was able to postpone a request for patent examination by up to 7 years for the 
patents applied by September 2001 under the Japanese patent law. Thus, a firm facing 
significant uncertainty as to the value of its invention could wait for a significant period 
of time without losing the patenting option. Thus, what Figure 3 suggests is consistent 
with Proposition 3: a firm facing larger uncertainty has a lower rate of patent utilization, 
                                 ( F i g u r e   3 )  
4. Empirical Estimation 
4.1 Framework of empirical estimation 
In this paper, we estimate a patent acquisition function and a patent (internal) use 
function. Proposition 1 of section 2 implies that ex ante appropriability advantage (or  1 3
anticipated size of complementary assets) has a positive impact on patent acquisition 
but a negative effect on patent utilization rate. On the other hand, Proposition 2 implies 
that higher quality of the invention portfolio of a firm has a positive impact both on the 
size of patent stocks granted and on the patent utilization rate. Thus, the estimation of 
the two equations helps us identify whether a particular factor enhancing the patent 
acquisition by a firm affects patent acquisitions from appropriability side or from 
invention quality side. 
In the patent acquisition function, the dependent variable is the patent stock 
owned by firm i as of the end of 2001 fiscal year (generally, March 31st in 2002), or the 
average of those for 2001 and 2002 fiscal years, using the common sample. Although 
the theory developed in section 2 refers to the patenting and utilization of a marginal 
invention, we use the stock data of the patents owned and their utilization, due to the 
limitation of data availability. The patent acquisition function combines the invention 
production function and the patent propensity function, corresponding to equation (6.1). 
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In the patent use function, the proportion of the patents used internally in the total 
patents of a firm is a dependent variable, corresponding to the conditional probability 
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4.2 Sample and Variables 
We have the following four sources of firm level data matched by the tickers of the 
publicly traded companies. The information on the patent stocks granted and the 
proportion of the patents used internally is from the SIPRA data (Survey of Intellectual 
Property-Related Activities) by the Japan Patent Office
11. The information on the 
business and financial status of firms is from NEEDS database (Nikkei Electronic 
Economic Database Systems) which mainly uses the annual reports by the firms 
submitted to the financial regulatory authority of Japan. The other patent information is 
from the Patent Quarterly Journal and Corporate Patent & Financial Statistics Yearbook 
compiled by IPB (Intellectual Property Bank Corporation) the US Patent Citations Data 
prepared by Bronwyn Hall
12.  
We constructed the variables for estimation in the following way. See Table 1 
for a summary of the definitions and the expected signs of the explanatory variables in 
estimations: 
(Table 1) 
(1) Dependent variables 
We use the total number of patents owned by a firm (pat) as of the end of 2001FY 
(generally, March 31st in 2002) in the patent acquisition function, and the proportion of 
the patents used internally in the total patents (jishar(=jisha/pat)) in that fiscal year 
(usually, between April 1st in 2001 and March 31st in 2002) in the patent (internal) use  1 5
function
13. We also use the average of these variables in 2001FY and 2002FY with 
respect to the common sample. 
(2) Explanatory variables 
Complementary assets  
(a) Employment size of a firm (emp90) 
We use the employment size of a firm in 1990FY (FY: Fiscal Year) as the indicator of 
the overall size of complementary asset useful for commercializing patented inventions 
of the firm (we use the intensity variable for the size of fixed asset, see the following 
paragraph). Since patented technology would affect firm size only with some lag, 
employment size in 1990FY would be significantly exogenous with respect to the stock 
of patents granted as of 2001FY. Proposition 1 suggests that the expected sign of this 
variable should be positive in the patent acquisition function and negative in the patent 
use function. 
 
(b) Tangible fixed assets / Size of employment of the firm (tfa90/emp90) 
The fixed asset and employment ratio in 1990FY represents the relative importance of 
fixed asset with respect to employment as complementary assets, controlling for the 
overall size of complementary assets by employment size. According to Proposition 1, 
the expected sign of this variable is also positive in the patent acquisition function and it 
is negative in the patent use function, if fixed asset is important as a complementary 
asset. 
 
Quality of inventions  1 6
We use the following two variables. As indicated by Proposition 2, we expect that the 
signs of these variables are positive in both the patent acquisition function and the 
patent use function. 
 
(c) Average success rate of passing patent examination (success) 
One indicator of the average quality of the inventions of a firm which we use is the 
weighted average success rate of a firm in passing patent examinations between 1997 
and 1999 in terms of the year of examination request. The weights we use are 0.870 for 
1997, 0.953 for 1998, 1.0 for 1999, reflecting the degree of the completion of the 
requested examinations. The success rate is lower for the patents examination of which 
are more recently requested, due to higher degree of incompletion of examinations. We 
use higher weight for more recent years to correct this bias. 
 
(d) Forward citations of the patents granted (citation) 
We use the number of forward citations (median) until 2002 for the US patents granted 
between 1988 and 1997 to a firm. Those firms whose patents are cited more would have 
inventions with higher quality on the average. Since the number of forward citations 
varies with patent application year and technological field, we adjust this measure 
divided by the average number of forward citations for each application year and each 
IPC subclass code. 
 
Uncertainty in the development stage 
(e) Average time necessary for the patents granted (aveyear) 
In Japan as in Europe, the Patent Office examines the patent application only if it is 
requested by an applicant. In the period of the sample of this study a firm could defer 
the examination request by up to seven years. As a result, a firm facing large invention  1 7
quality uncertainty can spend more time before requesting patent examinations so as to 
screen out low quality inventions. We use the average time which elapsed between the 
applications and the grants for the patents granted between 1997 and 1999 as an 
indicator of the degree of uncertainty in the development stage. We expect that a firm 
with longer aveyear would have a smaller number of patents. In addition, such firm 
would have a lower utilization rate of its patents since such firm faces higher risk 
between patent application and commercialization (according to Proposition 3). 
 
Effect of licensing possibility 
(f) Whether or not a firm has at least one patent licensed out (license) 
We use a dummy indicating whether or not a firm has licensed out at least one patent 
during 2001FY to test Proposition 4. This variable would have a positive effect on the 
patent stocks owned in patent acquisition function, while it has a negative effect in the 
patent use function, according to Proposition 4. 
 
Effect of the price cost margin of a firm 
(g) Price cost margin of a firm (pcm90) 
We use price cost margin (pcm) which is defined as the ratio between the excess of the 
sales value over the cost of goods sold and the sales value in 1990FY, to represent the 
profitability of the complementary assets of a firm. If the combination of preemptive 
R&D and sleeping patents is important as a determinant of unused patents, we expect 
that the price cost margin (pcm) has a negative sign on the rate of utilizing the patents 
(see Proposition 5). On the other hand, if the preemptive R&D is not important, it may 
even have a positive sign to the extent that it represents the quality of an invention (see  1 8
Proposition 2). In either case it would have positive coefficients in the patent acquisition 
function.  
 
(3) Other Variables 
(h) Size of R&D (rdemp) 
We use R&D personnel as of the end of 2001FY to represent size of R&D in the patent 
acquisition function. Since the R&D expenditure data of NEEDS database is not 
comprehensive in firm coverage, we use the R&D personnel data reported in SIPRA, 
although it has only recent data. We expect that it has a positive coefficient since a firm 
with more investment in R&D has more inventions to be patented. 
 
(i) Degree of the diversification of R&D (div) 
The degree of diversification of a firm may affect the research productivity as well as 
the appropriability of research. If it enhances either or both of them, it would have a 
positive coefficient in the patent acquisition function. On the other hand, the 
diversification of a firm would negatively affect the patent utilization rate if its main 
effect is to enhance the appropriability of an invention, but it would positively affect the 
utilization of patents if it results in the improvement of invention quality. We measure 
the degree of diversification of a firm by using the HHI index of the patent portfolio of 
each firm among 12 technology fields in 2001FY (div=1-HHI). 
 
(j) Growth rate of the sales of a firm (grsales01_90) 
We take growth rate of sales from 1990FY to 2001FY as a control variable. It would 
control the effects that a rapidly-growing firm tends to have smaller number of patents  1 9
for a given level of recent R&D. Thus, it would have a negative coefficient in patent 
acquisition function. It would also represent the unanticipated effects of growth in 
complementary assets. In this case, it would have a positive effect on the patent 
utilization.  
 
(k) Age of a firm (age) 
Age of a firm (age) is the difference between 2002 and the establishment year of the 
firm. Since a firm would have a larger number of patents the longer it undertakes R&D 
for a given size of R&D, age of a firm would have a positive coefficient in patent 
acquisition function. It may also represent the experience in R&D and patenting and the 
stock of know-how, implying a positive coefficient. In addition, age of a firm would 
have a positive coefficient in patent use function, if it represents the capability of a firm 
to generate high quality inventions.   
 
(l) Industry dummy (ind.dummys) 
We use detailed industry dummies (ind.dummies) to control the other missing variables, 
including the differences of the level of the number of patents per R&D in the patent 
acquisition function. They are defined at six-digit industry level. 
 
For emp90, tfa90/emp90, success, citation, aveyear, pcm90, div (plus one), rdemp, and 
age, we use log transformation in all samples. Our sample is cross-sectional data, 
consisting of 685 firms, with 106 industries in total. It covers about 35% of R&D 
expenditures of the Japanese firms, and 31% of the patent applications in Japan (see  2 0
Table A1-1 and A1-2 in the Appendix).The summary statistics in details are shown in 
the Appendix Tables (see Table A2-1 and A2-2 in the Appendix). 
 
5. Estimation results and discussions 
Table 2 shows the results of estimation. We use three samples depending on the scope 
of the independent variables used. In sample 1, we use only the NEEDS database for 
explanatory variables, so that we do not use the variables on the invention quality and 
the average length for the patents to be granted. We add the variables dependent on the 
records of patent examinations (success and aveyear) in sample 2, and add (forward) 
citation index from the US Patent Citations Data in sample 3. The estimation results for 
the patent acquisition function are listed on the left side of the table and those for the 
patent use function on the right side. 
(Table 2) 
First, let us see whether we can find evidence supporting Proposition 1. The 
estimation results for the patent acquisition function (estimations (1) ~ (6)) show that 
the size of the employment (emp90) affect the patent stocks of a firm (pat) positively 
and highly significantly, even controlling for the effects of R&D. Moreover, the 
coefficient size of the employment is larger than that of R&D, indicating the importance 
of the complementary asset as a determinant of the patent acquisition decision, which is 
consistent with the finding by Hall and Ziedonis (2001). The ratio between intangible 
fixed assets and the employment of a firm (tfa90/emp90) is also significant in 
estimations (1) and (2), although the size of coefficient is one third or less than that of 
employment. Thus, the patent stocks granted increases with the size of complementary 
assets of the firm in terms of both employment and fixed assets, even after controlling  2 1
for the effect of the size of R&D (rdemp), which is also highly significant. This result is 
consistent with Proposition 1. The coefficient of the size of complementary assets of a 
firm in terms of the size of the employment (emp90) is negative and highly significant 
in the patent use function. This result that patent utilization rate is lower for a firm with 
larger employment is also consistent with Proposition 1. A firm with large size of 
complementary assets has high patenting propensity, since such firm can afford to seek 
a patent for even low–quality invention, but lower quality invention has higher 
probability of not being used ex post, due to technological obsolescence for an example. 
The ratio of tangible fixed assets relative to the employment of the firm (tfa90/emp90), 
however, does not have a significant coefficient, although the coefficient is negative. 
Secondly, estimations (3) to (6) in Table 2 show that both the average success 
rate of passing patent examination (success) and forward citations (citation) have 
significantly positive effects on the patent acquisition, which support Proposition 2. 
However, we find a significant effect of these invention quality variables in the patent 
utilization function in only one case (estimation (12)), although they have positive 
coefficients (see estimations (9) to (12)). Thus, we can find only weak evidence 
supporting Proposition 2 as for the effect of invention quality on patent use. This may 
be due to the limitations of these two measures of invention quality. In particular, they 
may not adequately reflect the degree of complementarity between the invention and the 
business assets of a firm. 
Thirdly, as shown in estimations (9) to (12), the average time necessary for the 
patents to be granted (aveyear) has a negative and significant coefficient in patent 
utilization rate (although only at 10% level), consistent with Proposition 3. A firm 
facing higher uncertainty has lower patent utilization rate. In addition, estimations (3) to  2 2
(6) show that the coefficient of this variable is negative in the patent acquisition. This 
result is not surprising, since a firm which takes more time for requesting patent 
examination would have a smaller number of patents granted for a given number of 
inventions.  
Fourthly, the coefficient of the licensing dummy has a positive coefficient in 
the patent acquisition function (significant in estimations (2)), while it has a negative 
and significant coefficient in the patent use function (see estimation(8)) . That is, a firm 
which licenses its technology has a higher propensity to patent its invention and a lower 
rate of internally utilizing the granted patents. This finding supports Proposition 4. 
Fifthly, price cost margin (pcm90) has a positive coefficient in the patent 
acquisition function. At the same time, it has a positive and significant coefficient in all 
estimations for the patent use function. A positive sign of this variable indicates that a 
firm with higher profitability is likely to have a higher rate of utilizing the patents 
granted. Thus, our finding tends to reject the view that the primary cause for unused 
patents is that a firm with high market power chooses to pursue preemptive R&D and 
patenting.  
Finally, let us take a look at the coefficients of the rest of the variables: the 
degree of R&D diversification of the firm (div), the sales growth between 1990 and 
2001 (grsales90_01) and the age of a firm (age). The degree of R&D diversification of 
a firm has a positive effect on the number of patents acquired. As a result, the patent 
stocks granted increases not only with the size of R&D personnel (rdemp), but also with 
the R&D diversification (div). On the other hand, the degree of R&D diversification of 
a firm (div) has a negative and significant impact on the utilization rate of the patents. 
These results indicate that R&D diversification facilitates the appropriability of research  2 3
more than enhancing invention quality. The sales growth does not have a significant 
coefficient in patent acquisition function nor in the patent use function. This finding 
suggests that this variable may represent partially the unanticipated improvement of the 
availability of complementary assets. That is, when the availability of complementary 
assets improves unexpectedly, patents are more used, given the quality of inventions, 
which supports Proposition 1.The coefficient of the age of a firm (age) has positive and 
weakly significant coefficients in both functions. It suggests that this factor may help to 
represent the capability of a firm to generate high quality inventions.   
  Let us turn to the robustness check of our findings. There may exist potentially 
large reporting errors in the number of internally used patents, since such assessment 
would involve substantially subjective elements. We constructed the dataset that uses 
only the sample of the firms which responded to the surveys in two consecutive years in 
a consistent manner with respect to the number of internally used patents
14. We use the 
average numbers of the patents granted and the patent utilization rates for 2001FY and 
2002FY. This reduces the number of observations significantly (by 30%) but we may be 
able to reduce the errors in reporting significantly. Table 3 reports the estimation results. 
They are very similar to those in Table 2.   
    ( T a b l e   3 )  
In addition, we implemented the following estimation for the purpose of 
robustness check against outliers. We constructed the dataset which excluded the 
observations with the patent utilization rate of less than 5% or of more than 95%. Some 
firms may report extreme values in order to avoid the work of assessing the number of 
patents internally used. Such trimming of the sample, however, introduces downward 
bias in estimations, if firms do report honestly. Table 4 reports the estimation results,  2 4
which are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2. The major differences are that the 
invention quality and uncertainty variables (success, citation, aveyear), the license 
variable (license) and the R&D diversity variable (div) become less significant in patent 




This paper has examined the firm-level determinants of unused patents both 
theoretically and empirically. We have developed a simple model to explain unused 
patents, which take into accounts the difference between the ex ante (expected) quality 
of an invention in the patent application stage (or the stage of requesting a patent 
examination) and its ex post quality at the commercialization stage, as well as the sunk 
cost to be incurred between the patent application stage and its commercialization stage. 
We show that such model implies that the patent (internal) utilization rate decreases 
with the (anticipated) size of complementary assets, the licensing opportunities and the 
uncertainty in the development stage, while it increases with the average quality of 
inventions.  
We find empirical evidence supportive of these theoretical predictions, which 
are based on the large scale database of Japanese firms. Specifically, a firm with large 
complementary assets is more likely to acquire patents, controlling for the effects of 
R&D, while such firm has a lower patent utilization rate. A firm which licenses its 
patents has more patents but a lower (internal) patent utilization rate. A firm which 
spends more time from a patent application to a patent grant, which is likely to indicate 
the amount of uncertainty which a firm faces between these two stages, has a lower  2 5
patent utilization rate. A firm with high quality inventions has more patents granted as 
well as a higher patent utilization rate (although the evidence for the latter effect is not 
strong).  
We also find that a firm with larger price cost price margin tends to have a 
higher patent utilization rate, which does not support the view of preemptive R&D and 
patenting for entry deterrence as a primary explanation of unused patents. Finally, we 
find that a firm with more diversified patent portfolio has more patents but lower patent 
utilization rate, suggesting a possibility that such diversification enhances 
appropriability rather than efficiency of R&D. It is important to note that the last result 
may well depend on the level of technology classification. 
There are several important issues for further research. Although we have 
introduced the major determinants of patent acquisition and its use, including industry 
dummies at 6 digit levels in our econometric analysis, we may not fully control the 
potential biases due to missing variables. Although a panel data with significant time 
span are not currently available, its expected availability in the future would help us to 
implement fixed effect estimation. Our analysis suggests that diversification defined at a 
broad level of technology classification affects the R&D performance through 
appropriability than through efficiency. However, we do not differentiate R&D 
diversification and business diversification in our analysis. We clearly need further 
work to identify the effects of these two different aspects of diversification.    2 6
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Appendix (Mathematical and data appendixes) 
 
Appendix 1 (Proofs of propositions 1, 2 and 3) 
Let us denote the probability distribution of q by f(q; qm), and the cumulative 
probability that ε  is more than α  by g( α ). That is, denoting the probability 
distribution function of ε by  ) (ε t , we have 
ε ε α
α d t g ∫
∞
= ) ( ) (                               ( a . 1 )  
Here we assume that ε and q are independent. The conditional probability that a granted 
patent is used is given by   
} / | 0 Pr{ ) | 0 Pr( s k q q q k v v thre app = > > + = > > ε  
) Pr( / } , Pr{ thre thre q q q q q > > − > = ε  
             = ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
−
thre thre q m m q dq q q f dq q q f q g ) ; ( / ) ; ( ) (   ( a . 2 )                          
 
(1) Effects of the size of complementary asset and the sunk cost of applying a 
patent and its development 
If we take the derivative of (a.2) with respect to  s k qthre / = , we have 
× = ∂ > > ∂ ∫
∞
] } ) ; ( /{ ) ; ( [ / ) | 0 Pr(
2 dq q q f q q f q k v v
trhe q m m thre thre app  
0 ] 1 } ) ; ( ) ( [ > + − ∫
∞
dq q q f q g
thre q m thre                                 ( a . 3 )  
, given that both g( thre q ) and ∫
∞
thre q m dq q q f ) ; (  is less than one. Thus, generally, the 
conditional probability increases with s k qthre / = .  
(2) Effect of the mean quality of a patented invention 
Let us then consider the effect of the change of the qm which is the mean of the 
statistical distribution of q. We assume that the distribution function has a single peak at 
qm. 
) ( ) ; ( m m q q h q q f − =  with  0 '> h for q<qm and  0 '< h for q>qm, and  0 ' ' ≤ h    (a.4) 
Let us define w(q-qm) as the following variable. 
dq q q h q q h dx q x h q q h q q w m q m q m m m
thre trhe
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ' ) (
' − − + − − − = − ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
              ( a . 5 )  
Then, we have    2 9
0 ) ( = − ∫
∞
dq q x w
trhe q m                                          ( a . 6 )  
Given  0 ' ' ≤ h , and noting that  0 ) ( ) ( ' < − − = − ∫
∞
m thre q m q q h dx q x h
thre
, we have 
0 ) ( < − m q q w  for  q<qm and  0 ) ( ' > − m q q w  for  q>qm .                    (a.7) 
Thus, there exist qz (>qm), such that  ) ( m q q w −  has a negative value for q<qz  and a 
positive value for q>qz. 
By taking the derivative of equation (a.1) with respect to qm, we have 
× − = ∂ + > > ∂ ∫
∞
] } ) ( /{ 1 [ / ) | Pr(
2 dq q q h q f k v f v
trhe q m m app
0 } ) ( )) /( ( { ≥ − ∫
∞
dq q q w sq f g m q thre
                    ( a . 8 )  
, since g(f/(sq)) (>0) increases with q.  
(3) Effect of uncertainty 
If the distribution  ) (ε t  can be approximated by normal distribution ( ) ; ( σ ε tn  with 
standard deviationσ ), the variable ε  can be normalized by standard deviation (σ). 
Thus, 
η η ε σ ε
σ d tn d tn q g




− = = −
/ ) 1 ; ( ) ; ( ) (                                  ( a . 9 )  
Given that  s f s f k q / / ) ( > + > ,  it is clear that a larger standard deviation reduces 
g(-q), thus the above conditional probability. For a general case, the increase of 
uncertainty in terms of the expansion of the tails of the distribution of  ) (ε t  reduces 
g(-q) and the conditional probability.   
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Appendix 2 Survey of Intellectual Property-Related Activities 
The objective of the Survey of Intellectual Property-Related Activities (SIPRA), first 
conducted in 2002 October, is to obtain information on (1) the trends of industrial 
property rights applications and registrations (2) the usage of IPRs (3) information on 
the IPR management at the firm, and (4) trends of industrial property right infringement 
disputes in Japan. The SIPRA data for the 2001
st fiscal year covers firms, individuals, 
and public organizations which submit more than three patent applications in 2000 
(16,136 organizations and individuals). It also covers randomly the firms, individuals, 
and public organizations which submit less than three patent applications in 2000, 
amounting to 516 entities of these organizations and individuals in total. The survey 
was conducted in October, 2002, and its response rate was 41.1%. The number of valid 
response is 6,616 organizations and individuals. Appendix Table A1-1 provides the 
coverage of the above survey with respect to the data of the Survey of Research and 
Development by Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency Government 
of Japan, which is a compulsory survey. The coverage ratio of this survey in terms of 
R&D activities is very high. Appendix A1-2 shows the coverage of the patents by this 
survey in the Japanese patent applications and grants as reported by the Japan Patent 
Office Annual Report 2002. We estimate that this survey captures more than 60% of the 
patent applications and examination requests in Japan.  3 1
 
                                         
1Even if there is no uncertainty, the lag between an invention and its exploitation can 
cause unused patents. New patents will be unused until the firm completes the 
complementary investment to make ready for commercialization. Thus, a firm with a 
longer gestation period from an invention and its exploitation has more unused patents, 
just as a firm with longer production process has a larger work-in-progress. 
2 In this paper, we define complementary assets as the firm’s assets or capabilities 
which can be used to commercialize patented technologies. See section 2 for a rigorous 
definition. 
3  However, there is a recent large scale patent-level survey on the utilization of patents 
in Europe (see Gambardella (2004)). 
4  1938, 1948 and 1952. 
5  For the details of the data coverage of the SIPRA, see section 3. 
6  A quite parallel analysis holds for the case of cost-reducing innovation. 
7 The technological quality here is defined by its capability to generate income, 
combined with the complementary assets of a firm. Thus, a basic invention with a high 
degree of scientific component can have low quality if it cannot be readily 
commercialized.  
8 It is easy to see that unexpected growth of complementary assets increases the patent 
utilization rate. This effect is taken into account in the empirical analysis. 
9  Non-sunk cost for commercializing a patent does not affect the basic results, as long 
as it is small relative to the value of the patent.     
10 In the SIPRA, “use” of patents is defined as follows: either the use of patented 
products or the use of patent for production. 
11  For some details, please see appendix 2 of this paper. 
12 It is an extension of the NBER database described by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(2001), and available from her home page. 
13 We do not have structural information concerning patents stocks in terms of 
application years and technological fields.  3 2
                                                                                                                       
14  We use the observations only if the reported internal utilization rates for 2001FY and 
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Figure 2 Patent internal utilzation rate by sectors0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
less than 3 years
3-less than 4 years
4-less than 5 years
5-less than 6 years
6-less than 7 years
7-less than 8 years
8-less than 9 years
9 years or more
utilization ratio






the number of total patents owned as of
the end of 2001fiscal year or 2002 fiscal
year, or their average
SIPRA
jishar
the proportion of the patents used
internally in the total patents owned
during 2001fiscal year or 2002 fiscal
year, or the average
SIPRA
emp90 the size of employment of a firm in
1990FY NEEDS +-
tfa90/emp90
tangible fixed assets in 1990FY over size
of employment of the firm in 1990FY NEEDS +-
success
the weighted average success rate of a
firm in passing patent examination
between 1997 and 1999 in terms of the
year of examination request
IPB ++
citation
the number of forward citations (median)




the average time necessary for the




whether or not a firm has licensed out at
least one patent during 2001fiscal year
(usually, between April 1st in 2001 and
March 31st in 2002)
SIPRA +-
pcm90
the price cost margin of a firm in




the number of R&D personnel as of the
end of 2001fiscal year (generally, March
31st in 2002) or the average.
SIPRA +
div
the degree of the diversification of
research of a firm measured by 1 - the
HHI index of the patent application
portfolio among 12 technology fields in
2001 or the average.
SIPRA +-
grsales01_90
the growth rate of sales in 2001FY to
that in 1990FY. That is, (sales in
2001FY-sales in 1990FY)/sales in
NEEDS -+
age
the age of a firm as of the end of
2001fiscal year (generally, March 31st in
2002). That is, 2002-foundation year.
SIPRA ++
ind.dummys industry dummy variables (6 digits) NEEDS
Note) SIPRA stands for Survey of Intellectual Property-Related Actvities.
Variable Definition Data Source
Expected SignTable 2  Determinants of patent acquisition and use (based on 2001FY data, full observations)
Full Sample
Estimation Sample1 Sample1 Sample2 Sample2 Sample3 Sample3 Sample1 Sample1 Sample2 Sample2 Sample3 Sample3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable pat pat pat pat pat pat jishar jishar jishar jishar jishar jishar
ln(emp90) 0.454*** 0.435*** 0.519*** 0.514*** 0.677*** 0.669*** -0.070*** -0.059*** -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.058*** -0.050***
[0.057] [0.057] [0.060] [0.060] [0.061] [0.062] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015]
ln(tfa90/emp90) 0.179*** 0.146** 0.121 0.109 0.076 0.06 -0.028 -0.021 -0.032 -0.026 -0.026 -0.019
[0.069] [0.069] [0.076] [0.077] [0.076] [0.078] [0.019] [0.019] [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.025]
ln(success) 0.520*** 0.506*** 0.002 0.003
[0.193] [0.194] [0.058] [0.058]
ln(citation) 0.530*** 0.530*** 0.09 0.094*
[0.159] [0.158] [0.056] [0.056]
ln(aveyear) -0.181 -0.197 -0.121 -0.131 -0.094* -0.088* -0.097* -0.090*
[0.159] [0.160] [0.157] [0.157] [0.051] [0.051] [0.054] [0.054]
license 0.264*** 0.067 0.077 -0.064*** -0.042* -0.045*
[0.075] [0.075] [0.074] [0.023] [0.025] [0.027]
ln(pcm90) 0.137 0.145 0.134 0.139 0.108 0.111 0.061** 0.060** 0.059* 0.059* 0.068** 0.067*
[0.099] [0.097] [0.100] [0.100] [0.097] [0.097] [0.028] [0.028] [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.034]
ln(rdemp) 0.542*** 0.518*** 0.436*** 0.433*** 0.353*** 0.349***
[0.043] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044]
ln(div+1) 0.459*** 0.451*** 0.141 0.134 0.065 0.058 -0.166*** -0.158*** -0.129** -0.129** -0.129** -0.128**
[0.175] [0.174] [0.175] [0.176] [0.170] [0.171] [0.052] [0.052] [0.058] [0.058] [0.061] [0.061]
grsales01_90 -0.016 -0.011 0 0 0.055 0.053 0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
[0.044] [0.043] [0.058] [0.058] [0.054] [0.054] [0.012] [0.012] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
ln(age) 0 0.02 0.066 0.073 0.182* 0.192* 0.067** 0.063* 0.066* 0.064* 0.068* 0.065
[0.108] [0.108] [0.105] [0.106] [0.108] [0.109] [0.033] [0.033] [0.036] [0.036] [0.040] [0.040]
ind.dummies
Constant -2.362*** -2.105*** -1.104 -1.019 -2.645*** -2.550*** 1.279*** 1.203*** 1.461*** 1.396*** 1.477*** 1.399***
[0.764] [0.762] [0.847] [0.851] [0.841] [0.846] [0.231] [0.231] [0.285] [0.287] [0.298] [0.301]
Observations 638 638 454 454 393 393 638 638 454 454 393 393
Log likelihood -3855.906 -3849.708 -2942.74 -2942.345 -2570.551 -2570.019
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.139 0.137 0.137 0.146 0.146 0.193 0.203 0.205 0.209 0.251 0.256
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In case of negative binominal regression, Pseudo R2 is shown instead of Adjusted R2.
























sTable 3　Determinants of patent acquisition and use (based on the common sample of 2001FY and 2002 FY)
Sample1 Sample1 Sample2 Sample2 Sample3 Sample3 Sample1 Sample1 Sample2 Sample2 Sample3 Sample3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent pat pat pat pat pat pat jishar jishar jishar jishar jishar jishar
ln(emp90) 0.395*** 0.389*** 0.463*** 0.463*** 0.576*** 0.570*** -0.059*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.030** -0.044*** -0.035**
[0.073] [0.072] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]
ln(tfa90/emp90) 0.219*** 0.206** 0.150* 0.150* 0.145* 0.143* -0.019 -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 0.005 0.007
[0.085] [0.085] [0.087] [0.088] [0.084] [0.084] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
ln(success) 0.643*** 0.643*** 0.017 0.021
[0.200] [0.201] [0.058] [0.058]
ln(citation) 0.355** 0.350** 0.105* 0.111*
[0.174] [0.174] [0.059] [0.058]
ln(aveyear) -0.15 -0.15 -0.107 -0.105 -0.105* -0.107* -0.116* -0.121**
[0.193] [0.193] [0.190] [0.190] [0.059] [0.059] [0.059] [0.059]
license 0.198** -0.001 0.066 -0.088*** -0.051* -0.051*
[0.087] [0.089] [0.089] [0.029] [0.028] [0.029]
ln(pcm90) 0.287*** 0.311*** 0.254** 0.254** 0.165 0.178* 0.033 0.023 0.043 0.037 0.062* 0.055
[0.107] [0.107] [0.107] [0.108] [0.105] [0.106] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035]
ln(rdemp) 0.588*** 0.563*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.426*** 0.420***
[0.060] [0.061] [0.060] [0.060] [0.058] [0.058]
ln(div+1) 0.550** 0.525** 0.355 0.355 0.254 0.246 -0.131* -0.114 -0.125* -0.121* -0.141** -0.131*
[0.216] [0.215] [0.217] [0.217] [0.209] [0.209] [0.071] [0.070] [0.068] [0.068] [0.069] [0.068]
grsales01_90 -0.091 -0.094 -0.083 -0.083 -0.077 -0.079 0.001 0.007 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.003
[0.064] [0.064] [0.061] [0.061] [0.055] [0.056] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
ln(age) 0.133 0.161 0.029 0.029 0.198 0.206 0.05 0.047 0.024 0.024 0.005 0.001
[0.145] [0.146] [0.145] [0.145] [0.140] [0.141] [0.050] [0.050] [0.049] [0.048] [0.049] [0.049]
ind.dummies
Constant -3.305*** -3.392*** -0.742 -0.743 -2.425*** -2.379*** 1.007*** 0.986*** 1.468*** 1.402*** 1.601*** 1.541***
[0.916] [0.915] [0.933] [0.935] [0.920] [0.923] [0.300] [0.296] [0.300] [0.301] [0.303] [0.303]
Observations 389 389 310 310 282 282 389 389 310 310 282 282
Log likelihood -2425.895 -2423.358 -2021.228 -2021.228 -1842.651 -1842.378
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.146 0.144 0.144 0.152 0.152 0.198 0.22 0.276 0.283 0.334 0.34
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In case of negative binominal regression, Pseudo R-squared is shown instead of Adjusted R-squared.
Estimation Results
























sTable 4  Determinants of patent acquisition and use (based on 2001FY data, 5%-95% in patent use)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
pat pat pat pat pat pat jishar jishar jishar jishar jishar jishar
ln(emp90) 0.457*** 0.441*** 0.525*** 0.519*** 0.691*** 0.683*** -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.031** -0.047*** -0.041***
[0.060] [0.060] [0.063] [0.063] [0.063] [0.064] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
ln(tfa90/emp90) 0.153** 0.131* 0.129* 0.116 0.098 0.084 -0.014 -0.013 -0.018 -0.014 -0.005 0
[0.071] [0.071] [0.078] [0.079] [0.079] [0.080] [0.017] [0.017] [0.020] [0.021] [0.022] [0.023]
ln(success) 0.582*** 0.570*** 0.003 0.003
[0.201] [0.201] [0.052] [0.052]
ln(citation) 0.568*** 0.569*** 0.067 0.069
[0.165] [0.164] [0.050] [0.050]
ln(aveyear) -0.21 -0.23 -0.162 -0.17 -0.059 -0.055 -0.053 -0.049
[0.172] [0.173] [0.169] [0.169] [0.048] [0.048] [0.050] [0.050]
license 0.203*** 0.078 0.068 -0.019 -0.03 -0.032
[0.077] [0.078] [0.077] [0.020] [0.023] [0.024]
ln(pcm90) 0.207** 0.208** 0.187* 0.193* 0.14 0.142 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.066** 0.066** 0.081*** 0.081***
[0.102] [0.101] [0.103] [0.103] [0.100] [0.100] [0.025] [0.025] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031]
ln(rdemp) 0.529*** 0.514*** 0.446*** 0.443*** 0.357*** 0.356***
[0.045] [0.046] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047]
ln(div+1) 0.151 0.145 0.003 -0.005 -0.067 -0.073 -0.055 -0.054 -0.055 -0.055 -0.065 -0.064
[0.179] [0.179] [0.182] [0.182] [0.176] [0.176] [0.046] [0.046] [0.052] [0.052] [0.054] [0.054]
grsales01_90 -0.014 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 0.061 0.058 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004
[0.043] [0.043] [0.058] [0.058] [0.055] [0.055] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
ln(age) 0.004 0.019 0.071 0.077 0.18 0.187* 0.049* 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.051 0.049
[0.111] [0.111] [0.109] [0.109] [0.112] [0.112] [0.029] [0.029] [0.032] [0.032] [0.036] [0.036]
ind.dummies
Constant -2.906*** -2.737*** 0.177 0.226 -1.643* -1.603* 1.001*** 0.982*** 0.951*** 0.928*** 0.968*** 0.940***
[0.908] [0.907] [0.873] [0.873] [0.881] [0.882] [0.231] [0.232] [0.261] [0.261] [0.275] [0.275]
Observations 562 562 421 421 365 365 562 562 421 421 365 365
Log likelihood -3473.537 -3470.05 -2750.784 -2750.294 -2402.952 -2402.556
Adjusted R-square 0.137 0.138 0.136 0.137 0.146 0.146 0.143 0.143 0.156 0.157 0.219 0.222
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%



























Patent Acquisition Function (NBREG) Patent Use Function (OLS)
sample1 sample2 sample3 sample1 sample2 sample3Appendix Table A2-1
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
pat 638 601.603 3157.413 1 72028 454 814.738 3718.383 5 72028 393 922.155 3986.057 5 72028
jishar 638 0.503 0.265 0.002 1 454 0.453 0.242 0.002 1 393 0.447 0.239 0.002 1
emp90 638 2722.936 5956.492 36 70841 454 3498.689 6888.746 87 70841 393 3789.756 7297.496 133 70841
tfa90/emp9 638 15.046 34.297 0.424 702.372 454 14.986 23.037 0.544 223.696 393 15.028 21.516 0.701 223.696
success x x x x x 454 0.648 0.117 0.095 0.941 x x x x x
citation x x x x x x x x x x 393 0.784 0.428 0 3.25
aveyear x x x x x 454 6.744 1.512 2.217 10.697 393 6.861 1.454 2.217 10.697
license 638 0.514 0.500 0 1 454 0.615 0.487 0 1 393 0.634 0.482 0 1
pcm90 638 0.237 0.122 0.036 0.808 454 0.233 0.117 0.036 0.808 393 0.236 0.118 0.042 0.808
rdemp 638 360.198 1526.873 1 32130 454 478.791 1794.662 4 32130 393 540.842 1921.431 5 32130
div 638 0.357 0.298 0 0.877 454 0.411 0.293 0 0.877 393 0.431 0.289 0 0.877
grsales01_9 638 0.267 0.970 -0.754 16.125 454 0.222 0.680 -0.627 6.287 393 0.226 0.702 -0.618 6.287
age 638 61.950 20.209 4 131 454 63.656 20.255 4 131 393 65.242 20.001 9 131
ind.dummys 638 454 393 106 industries 90 industries 83 industries
Variable sample1 sample2 sample3Appendix Table A2-2
pat jishar emp90 tfa90/emp90 license pcm90 rdemp div grsales01_90 age
pat 1
jishar -0.12 1
emp90 0.579 -0.185 1
tfa90/emp90 -0.007 0.024 0.144 1
license 0.120 -0.272 0.232 0.043 1
pcm90 -0.012 0.005 -0.037 0.087 0.019 1
rdemp 0.558 -0.095 0.647 -0.010 0.092 0.034 1
div 0.164 -0.219 0.266 0.111 0.201 -0.042 0.138 1
grsales01_90 -0.015 0.018 -0.052 0.045 -0.009 0.145 0.020 -0.006 1
age 0.058 -0.066 0.101 0.005 0.132 -0.043 0.050 0.163 -0.231 1
pat jishar emp90 tfa90/emp90 success aveyear license pcm90 rdemp div grsales01_90 age
pat 1
jishar -0.113 1
emp90 0.573 -0.154 1
tfa90/emp90 -0.010 -0.056 0.263 1
success -0.064 0.024 -0.061 0.007 1
aveyear 0.078 -0.137 0.105 0.011 -0.147 1
license 0.101 -0.173 0.198 0.110 0.017 0.092 1
pcm90 -0.006 0.005 -0.025 0.113 0.167 0.101 0.043 1
rdemp 0.552 -0.072 0.642 -0.015 -0.087 0.118 0.060 0.049 1
div 0.161 -0.142 0.247 0.185 -0.130 0.070 0.121 -0.031 0.121 1
grsales01_90 -0.011 -0.049 -0.053 0.029 -0.014 0.005 0.035 0.167 0.031 -0.032 1
age 0.054 -0.018 0.082 -0.003 0.059 0.057 0.101 -0.005 0.041 0.163 -0.183 1
pat jishar emp90 tfa90/emp90 success citation aveyear license pcm90 rdemp div grsales01_90 age
pat 1
jishar -0.117 1
emp90 0.575 -0.158 1
tfa90/emp90 -0.013 -0.037 0.261 1
success -0.070 -0.001 -0.055 0.035 1
citation 0.023 0.142 -0.006 -0.103 -0.013 1
aveyear 0.072 -0.126 0.089 0.015 -0.101 -0.044 1
license 0.102 -0.184 0.194 0.114 -0.019 0.007 0.085 1
pcm90 -0.014 0.007 -0.036 0.088 0.170 -0.050 0.094 0.034 1
rdemp 0.549 -0.072 0.643 -0.018 -0.091 0.035 0.110 0.055 0.045 1
div 0.161 -0.152 0.236 0.156 -0.090 -0.053 0.053 0.132 -0.079 0.115 1
grsales01_90 -0.012 -0.039 -0.058 0.024 0.049 0.007 0.004 0.036 0.170 0.031 -0.049 1
age 0.044 -0.024 0.065 0.004 0.078 -0.094 0.050 0.088 0.028 0.027 0.169 -0.165 1
Variable sample3
Variable sample1
Variable sample2